I LIKE TO THINK; suppose we wish to present
the liar's paradox. the liar's
paradox is perhaps the most
famous in mathematics
besides zeno's. so anyway,
we walk to our chalkboard
and write: the liar's paradox
says that this is a lie. now
the liar's paradox itself is
written pthis is a lie.' the
demonstrative pronoun 'this'
refers there to the liar's
paradox statement.
however in our chalkboard
presentation there is jo
logical reason why dp-this
[demonstrative pronoun 'this']
cannot refer to the
presentation being made.
so in other words our special
chalkboard-liars-paradox
seems to dispute the truth
of the presentation. this
conundrum with the
modifiable x-liar's paradox
is endemic. therefore in
essence x can be all of
mathematics. so
{(this is a lie)
=
(all mathematics is a lie)}
is reasonable interpretation.
concluding bizarrely then if
all maths is a lie then all
paradoxes are necessarily
false. so an ultra paradox
exists: 'no paradox is true'.
if 'no paradox is true' is true
then then ultra paradox itself
is false. so 'no paradox is
then (ever) false.' the double
negative is mischievously
unprovable. therefore the ultra
paradox as such is not provably
true or false. since we now have
{general case:
(u-paradox is unprovable)
=
specific case:
(maths is a lie is unprovable)}?
Then mathematics cannot
demonstrate its own truthiness.
this sounds eerily like Godel's
theorem. that's all i got. ALL IDEAS AND EQUATIONS
EXCEPT WHERE INDICATED
ARE OF ACCOUNT HOLDER